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The Soviet block countries are making great efforts to obtain high
technology goods manufactured or designed in the United States. The
United States is making equally great efforts to stop the flow of this
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technology to Soviet block countries. A key component of the United
States government's effort to halt the export of high technology is a
program called Operation Exodus. Operation Exodus is overseen by the
United States Customs Service, which has broad authority to stem the
tide of illegal technology exports. This Article will describe Operation
Exodus, its impact on the illegal export of high technology, and who it
affects. The Article will also assess what high technology export companies should do to comply with export licensing to avoid civil and
criminal penalties under Operation Exodus.
Section I provides background on the growth of technology in the
United States military, and compares the United States' advances in
technology with the Soviet Union's inferior technological position. Section II discusses the quantity and quality of technology smuggled out of
the United States and Soviet methods for obtaining western technology.
Section III describes existing laws to stem the illegal flow of high technology and the procedures that must be followed to export technology.
Section IV details Operation Exodus, what it is, how it operates, and the
program's results. The section also provides an overview of the penalties exporters may face if they violate export laws, and gives an analysis
of the attempted extraterritorial applications of Operation Exodus, including salient legal challenges to United States' efforts to stop certain
technology exports. Section V summarizes export protocols the practitioner and the export company should follow. Exporters cannot avoid
dealing with government bureaucracies and continually changing regulations, particularly in the field of high technology. Familiarity and
communication with relevant agencies is critical for the successful exporter. The Article concludes that while Operation Exodus is a strong
effort by the United States to stem the illegal export of high technology
to eastern block nations, accurate information on the Operation's effectiveness may not be available for several years.
I. BACKGROUND
The high technology industry is a booming business, especially in
the computer and laser fields because of their military applications.
High technology is projected to be the growth industry, not only in the
United States, but in the rest of the developing world as well.' A major
catalyst for this growth in the United States is the emphasis on military
defense spending in the government's budget.2 In recent years, defense
1. See A. ToFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE (1980).
2. See A Cost-Effective Pentagon, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 21, 1985, at 25, col. 1.
"During the first four years of the Reagan administration alone Congress appropriated $1
trillion for the Nation's defense." Id
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spending has been the fastest growing part of the economy. 3 For example, the total 1984-85 budget for the United States Department of Defense was approximately $247 billion, with a large portion going into
three aspects of defense: salaries, weapons acquisition, and weapons
modernization. 4 Recent budgets continue this trend. Modernization
and acquisition mean that the Pentagon purchases appropriate technology and high technology goods to give the United States military a strategic edge over the Soviets.5
Most commentators agree that the United States and its NATO allies presently maintain a technological advantage over the Soviet Union
and Warsaw pact countries. 6 This technological edge over the Soviets is
considered essential, but it is shrinking quickly. 7 Soviet scientists and
engineers cannot compete with their counterparts in the United States
3. Cook, Defense Budget Boosts US. Economy as Civilian Sector Starts to Slow,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 7, col. 1.
4. Reagan's Mounting Defuwit, Maclean's, Jan. 17, 1983, at 20.
5. Referring to "edges," "superiority," and "inferiority" with respect to the United
States' and Soviet Union's military advantages brings one into a volatile, often rhetorical
(even Kafkaesque) shell game. Negotiations over the number of warheads per side seems
simplistic from a military, if not a moral, point of view. Both sides, it is argued, have
"enough" nuclear arms. In fact, the Union of Concerned Scientists now estimates the relative size of the world's nuclear arsenal as large enough to have a Hiroshima-size nuclear
explosion every second for two weeks. In any event, whether the U.S. or the Soviet
Union would ever gain military advantage over the other for any period of time is doubtful. See Bok, Distrus Secrecy, and the Arms Race, 95 ETHics 712 (1985). But, technological advances have moved the entire cold war dialogue onto a new plane, where talk is not
of weapon strength, throw weights, and kilotonnage, but of response-time, memory capacity, and the number of bits of microchips. See Lautenschlager, ControllingMilitary Technology, 95 ETHics 692 (1985). Maintaining a technological edge over the Soviets is critical
from a national security point of view. It is the purpose of this Article to describe one
small aspect of the government's efforts to maintain technological superiority over the Soviet Union. Operation Exodus is that aspect.
6. See, e.g., Flowe, Export Licensing of Computer Equipment and Technology--A
Practitioner'sPerspective,10 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 633, 640 (1985). While the U.S.
has a technological edge, it is deficient in military manpower and perhaps even firepower.
Id. For an excellent discussion of the history of technology trade between the East and
West, and for a background on the wavering and waffling U.S. policies on sharing technology (hardware and software) with the Soviets, see Note, National Security Protection:
The Critical Technologies Approach to U.S. Export Control of High-Level Technology, 15 J.
OF INT'L L. & ECON. 575 (1981). See generally Berman & Garson, United States Export
Controls--Pas Present and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791 (1961). For an excellent perspective on technology transfer to the Soviet Union for the practitioner, see Armstrong,
Transferring US Technology to the Soviets: Some Practical Legal Problems, 16 INT'L
LAW. 737 (1982).
7. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 11-16. See Moles Who Burrow for
Microchips, TIME, June 17, 1985, at 25, col. 2 [hereinafter Moles]. The TME article makes
clear that there are always persons willing to make a profit on key technology whether
that technology has military applications or not. Many technology leaks are simply a process of products finding their way to the market. Both eastern European and western Eu-
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in key areas of military technology, particularly in microchips and lasers.8 While some Soviets dispute the United States' technological superiority,9 Mikhail Gorbachev concedes the Soviet's shortcomings in the
area of high technology.' 0 The Soviets have instituted a multi-pronged
approach to attempt to close the military technology gap. These approaches include: (1) an intensive internal development and educational program;" (2) espionage within the United States; 12 (3) internal
spies within the United States military;13 (4) setting up foreign corpora14
tions to make what appear to be legitimate high technology purchases;
15
(5) theft; and (6) exporting high technology goods and information out
of the United States without first obtaining proper government
6
clearances.1
The United States Customs Service and Operation Exodus purport
to stop technology that is unlicensed or controlled by law from being
exported or smuggled out of the United States. The remainder of this
Article concentrates on Operation Exodus and its efficacy in deterring
this type of undesirable exporting.
II. LOSS OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY GOODS FROM SMUGGLING
A.

THE COST OF SovIET ACQUISITIONS OF UNITED STATES
TECHNOLOGY

Estimates of the number of high technology goods smuggled out of
the United States vary. Since the late 1970's, United States intelligence
experts estimate that 30,000 pieces of high technology equipment and

400,000 technical documents have been smuggled out of the United
States. 17 Smuggling erodes any technological edge that the United
ropean merchants are willing middlemen if there is a buyer and a profit, even absent any
special Soviet efforts to entice a seller, or obtain a particular product.
8. 1I
9. Rempel, U.S. Deters Technology Smugglers, L.A. Times, Apr. 15, 1985, § 1, at 3,
col. 2.
10. Kempe, Moscow's Bid to Close Its Technology Gap Will Test Gorbachev, Wall St.
J., June 6, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
11. Id.
12. Moles, supra note 7, at 25.
13. See, e.g., the latest drama unfolding known as the "Walker family spy ring."
Richey, Walker Case Paints Rare Portraitof American Spy Family in Action, Christian
Sci. Monitor, Oct. 30, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
14. Bennett, The Great Russian Raid on US. Technology, READER'S DIG., Mar. 1984,
at 57.
15. How Soviets Steal U.S. High-Tech Secrets, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 12,
1985, at 33.
16. Rempel, supra note 9, § 1, at 3, col. 2.
17. Moles, supra note 7, at 25, col. 2. See also infra note 20 (specific examples of
smuggled equipment).

1986]

OPERATION EXODUS

States might have over the Soviet Union, and means that the Soviets do
not have to spend the necessary capital for research and development of
technological improvements. The Soviets can invest that money elsewhere in their admittedly stagnant economy. When the Soviet Union
obtains high technology from the United States, it also means that the
United States must spend more to maintain or regain a technological
advantage. The Soviets save billions of dollars and years of military research and development by using stolen high technology equipment
which the United States and its allies have developed to offset superior
numbers of Soviet weapons.' 8 This improves the military posture of the
Soviets and increases defense costs to United States taxpayers as the
Defense Department attempts to counter the Soviets. 19 Examples of
high technology being shipped or smuggled overseas are legion. 20
B.

SOVIET METHODS OF ACQUIRING HIGH TECHNOLOGY GOODS

Since the 1930s, Soviet efforts to obtain western technology have
been massive, well-planned, and well-managed. 21 In certain instances,
the Soviets obtained western technology by using existing scientific or
technological agreements with the West.22 Much of the increased trade
with the Soviets occurred during the period of detente in the 1970s. The
impetus to this trade was the assumption that sales of technology would
not only improve the United States' balance of trade but would also
moderate Soviet political views.2 3 Presently, the Soviets purchase
18. How Soviets Steal U.S. High-Tech Secrets, supra note 15, at 33.
19. Id
20. For example, the Customs Service, under Operation Exodus, has seized C130
troop transport carrier aircraft parts, satellite scanners, multi-spectral electronic test
equipment, a Doppler Survey System, and numerous computers and accessories with potential military application. DEP'T OF TREASURY, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, OPERATION ExODus, FACT SHEET (Dec. 1982) [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. Similarly, Customs intelligence
received from other agencies indicates that this is a serious threat that is expected to increase. Investigations of attempted shipments and conspiracies reveal a broad pattern of
criminal activity to export several types of technology including an advanced VAX computer valued in excess of $5 million, en route to the Soviet Union through diversion countries; a highly advanced computerized airborne spectral scanner with military potential
headed for the Soviets; firearms which were stolen from the National Guard, headed for
the Irish Republican Army extremists; artillery periscopes destined for Libya; and a plot
to steal HARPOON anti-ship missiles and ship them to Iraq. DEP'T OF TREASURY, U.S.
CUSTOMS SERVICE, OPERATION EXODUS BUSINESS ADVISORY No. 1 (Jan. 1984).
21. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SovIET ACQUISITION OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY 1

(Apr., 1982) [hereinafter CIA].
22. See Yore, Free Trade and National Security, CAL. LAW, July, 1985, at 47. An
often-cited example of technology trade is the Kama River truck plant in the Soviet
Union. Between 1971 and 1980, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued export licenses
for automotive technology and production equipment, including an IBM 370 computer.
See Note, supra note 6, at 591.
23. Malley, Technology Transfer Controls, 23 JURrMETRICS 33, 37 (1982). See also
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through illegal or unauthorized channels technology which is controlled
by law. They also purchase legally advanced technology with military
applications. 24 Before discussing how illegally exported goods are seized
under Operation Exodus, a brief overview of the export process is
25
needed.
Note, Effects of Soviet Ideology on the Legal Framework and Policy of US-USSR Trade, 1
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 75 (1976). During the 1970s, President Nixon, Secretary of
State, Henry Kissinger, and others in the Nixon Administration, began a policy of detente
with the Soviets. Detente affected U.S.-Soviet military, cultural, and political relations.
In a warming of the cold war attitudes of the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. allowed the Soviets
greater access to U.S. markets, selling them grain, technology, and other goods. Detente
also allowed U.S.-Soviet military parity. Parity in military strength, it was felt, would ensure that the Soviets would not launch a first strike against the U.S. for defensive reasons,
and would prevent the U.S. from launching a strike against the Soviets because the Soviets would have nuclear strength equal to that of the U.S. This equality of military
strength means that if there were a nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviets, there
would be mutually assured destruction (MAD).
The policy of detente continued into the Ford and Carter Administrations. President
Carter even asserted that it was time that the U.S. end its inordinate fear of the Soviet
Union. It was not until the Soviet crackdown in Poland, the Soviet invasion of Afganistan, and evidence of Soviet adventurism in the Middle East, Central America, Southeast
Asia, and Africa, that key policymakers in the U.S. began to reassess U.S. policies vis-a-vis
the Soviets. The Western allies began seeing trucks manufactured at the Kama River
truck plant, a plant using U.S. technology and equipment, enforcing martial law in Poland. Those trucks carried Soviet troops into Afganistan. The Soviets were quickly
matching U.S. military technology, for example, by adding to their arsenals such weapons
as stealth bombers, cruise missiles, neutron bombs, and, so-called "smart" bombs. During
the 1980 Presidential campaign, candidate Reagan hit on a theme that portrayed a weak
America because of a weak posture toward, and too much trust in, the Soviets. Reagan
campaigned against policies that were too cozy with the Soviets and that allowed them to
gain weapons superiority over the U.S., and he campaigned for a very strong defense.
When Reagan became President, new policies and programs were enacted in the area
of U.S.-Soviet relations. Those included: a massive defense budget, weapons procurement, increased espionage and a greater role for the CIA, hard lines against trade with
the Soviets (including a failed attempt to prevent the construction of a Trans-Siberian
pipeline), and increased programs to prevent shipment of technological goods to the Soviets by tightening U.S. trade laws and policies. It is from this last point that Operation
Exodus evolved.
24. Most of these legal purchases fall under the rubric of existing agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. CIA, supra note 21, at 1. The law primarfly responsible for controlling technology exports is the Export Administration
Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 1, 99 Stat. 120 (1985) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 2401-2419) [hereinafter EAA Amendments]. This Act is discussed extensively in
Greguras & Daunt, Export AdministrationAct of 1985, THE Sco'rr REP., Aug. 1985, at 4.
25. See Flowe, supra note 6, and Greguras & Durant, supra note 24. See EAA
Amendments, supra note 24, 99 Stat. at 120. A number of regulations deal with exporting
products, especially technology, to destinations outside of the U.S. See generally 22 C.F.R.
§ 2.1 (1986), 15 C.F.R. § 400 (1986), 15 C.F.R. §§ 300-399 (1986). For another overview of all
the hoops exporters must jump through and a discussion of the many specific laws Congress has enacted in this area, see Ellicott, Trends in Export Regulation, 38 Bus. LAw. 533
(1983).
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III.

UNITED STATES EXPORT LAWS AND PROCEDURES

The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), as administered by
the Commerce Department, controls exports of technical data and commodities, and reexports out of foreign countries of products or data with
United States-origin content.2 6 United States export controls under the
EAA are imposed for three major reasons: to protect national security
by restricting the export of militarily sensitive goods and data; to further United States foreign policy interests; and to limit the export of
27
products in short supply in the United States.
From the exporter's perspective, basic compliance with United
States export regulations consists of two steps. First, a company's products must be classified according to a commodity control list to determine the type of export license that is required. This determination
depends upon the nature of the product or its technical capabilities, the
product's value, the country that will be the ultimate destination of the
product, and the use to which the product will be put. Once these determinations are made, the second step is actually obtaining the export
license. This process may involve obtaining supporting documents and
assurances from the exporter's customer about the destination of the
product and who the ultimate user of the equipment or data will be.28
The majority of goods and technical data can be exported under
general licenses, such as "General Destination" ("G-DEST") licenses.
Exports made with these licenses do not require individual applications,
nor do they involve a specific licensing document. If technical data or
high technology products do not qualify for a G-DEST license (or for
another export license), then an individual validated license is required.
This process requires the exporter to apply to the government for an
actual export license. Most high technology exports require a validated
license.
In 1979, the Secretary of Defense developed a list of "Militarily
Critical Technologies" (MCT) placing emphasis upon:
(A)

arrays of design and manufacturing know-how;

(B) keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test equipment,
(C) goods accompanied by sophisticated operation, application, or
maintenance know-how, and
(D) keystone equipment which would reveal or give insight into
the design and manufacture of a United States military system, which are not possessed by, or available in fact from
sources outside the United States to, [sic] controlled countries
26. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 24012420, amended by Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985)) [hereinafter EAA].
27. 50 U.S.C. § 2401(d). (Supp. III 1985).
28. Ellicott, supra note 25, at 533.
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and which, if exported, would permit a significant advance in
29
a military system of any such country.
This MCT list is part of the "Commodity Control List" by which the
30
Secretary of Commerce regulates exports.
The MCT list covers a broad spectrum of "technologies that may
have substantial or primarily nonmilitary applications . . . [including]
computers, telecommunications, laser, and nuclear equipment." 3 ' After
the Reagan Administration released a CIA report detailing Soviet acquisition of United States' designed and manufactured technology, 32 President Reagan announced that all high technology export license
applications to the Soviet Union were suspended. 33 In 1982, the President, through executive orders, sought to limit the amount and kind of
technology available to the Soviets. All information became classified if
it concerned scientific or technological matters relating to national security.3 4 Scientific research not clearly related to national security may
not be classified, but information was classified if it "reasonably could
be expected to cause damage to the national security. '3 5 Classification
in these cases became mandatory, not discretionary, and the expectation
of damage to national security did not have to be identified even if there
was a reasonable doubt. 36 In addition, information could be classified
even if the government did not have any proprietary interest in the re37
search or its product.
The many laws, regulations, and policies aimed at intercepting or
preventing Soviet attempts to obtain high technology goods from the
United States are useful only if enforced. Concurrent with the announcement of regulations designed to prevent technology exports, the
Reagan Administration announced an extensive effort to control those
exports. That effort is Operation Exodus.
IV.

OPERATION EXODUS

In October 1982, the United States Customs Service began Opera29. 50 U.S.C. § 2404(d). (Supp. III 1985).
30. The most current MCT list is at 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1986). Cf. 49 Fed. Reg. 47,682
(1984) (final regulations on International Traffic in Arms Act).
31. See Ellicott, supra note 25, at 537.
32. CIA, supra note 21, at 1.
33. President's Statement on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union, 17
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Docs. 1429, 1430 (Dec. 29, 1981).
34. Exec. Ord. No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982) (national security information).
35. Id., at 14,875.
36. Id.
37. The public's interest in disclosure is not balanced against national security needs
in this case. This allows strict government control of high technology. Cf Environmental
Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Weissman v. Central Intelligence Agency,
565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally Ellicott, supra note 25, at 542.
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tion Exodus in response to the Reagan Administration's mandate to
stem the illegal export of strategic United States technology to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Operation Exodus also attempts
to stop the illegal export of arms and munitions to proscribed destinations. The primary objectives of Operation Exodus are: (1) to stop the
outflow of critical technology to the Soviets and to force compliance
with export laws by intercepting or seizing shipments of items and data
that are being exported illegally; and (2) to disrupt groups and individuals responsible for these illegal exports through arrests, prosecutions,
and other legal sanctions. A secondary objective is to stem the flow of
crucial merchandise to the Soviet Bloc and other embargoed nations;
examples are the equipment to be used in building the Soviet gas pipe38
line and a water filtration system in Libya.
A.

How

OPERATION EXODUS WORKS

The Customs Service has actively intercepted arms shipments since
the late eighteenth century when President Washington ordered the
Customs Service to ensure the United States' neutrality in the war between England and France. The Customs Service enforces more than
four hundred provisions of the law on behalf of some forty other federal agencies.
Under Operation Exodus, the Customs Service enforces the Export
Administration Act, 39 administered by the Commerce Department, and
the Arms Export Control Act,40 administered by the Department of
State's Office of Munitions Control. The Customs Service uses intelligence, inspection, and investigation in their operations. Customs agents,
inspectors, patrol officers, and other Customs personnel, including import specialists and regulatory auditors, focus on the illegal outflow of
critical technology through ports of exit throughout the United States.4 1
Inspectors and patrol officers review export documentation, determine
suspect cargo, and conduct export searches. Exodus agents identify
those shipments that require further investigation and then make appropriate referrals. The agents also have primary responsibility for
gathering intelligence and meeting with other government agencies,
both domestic and foreign.
In its first year, Operation Exodus was a "reactive program," con38.

FAcT SHEET, supra note 20.

39. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
40. Pub. L. No. 90-629, § 38, 82 Stat. 1320 (1968), as added Pub. L. No. 94-329,
§ 212(a)(1), 90 Stat. 744 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-92, § 20, 91 Stat. 623 (1977)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2778).
41. See FAcT SHEET, supra note 20, at 2.
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centrating on intensive export inspections. 42 At United States ports,
Customs Exodus teams-composed of Customs agents, inspectors, patrol
officers, and other Customs personnel-reviewed export documents,
and searched cargo. 43 In its second year, Operation Exodus shifted its
emphasis to anticipatory problems by developing intelligence, selective
cargo examinations, and investigations." Moreover, exodus investigators now seek to discover criminal conspiracies by targeting high-risk
45
commodities and companies through covert operations.
The crackdown by Customs officials under Operation Exodus has
been fairly successful. As of fiscal year 1985, there have been a total of
4420 seizures representing $302 million.46 The Operation has been responsible for 596 arrests, 799 indictments, and 359 convictions. 47 By
tightening export licensing procedures and punishing violators, Defense
42. DEP'T OF TREASURY, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, OPERATION EXODUS, FACT SHEET

(Jan. 1984).
43. fI at 2.
44. 1I
45. 1I
46. U.S. CuSTOMS SERVICE, EXODUS STATISTICS (1985) (available from U.S. Customs

Service, Washington, D.C.).
47. 1I The complete information is as follows:

EXODUS STATISTICS
F/Y 82
Seizures (number)
Seizures (value)
Detentions
Seizures/Detentions
Arrests
Indictments
Convictions

765
$ 55.6 M
2481
(31%)
195
171
134

F/Y 83

F/Y 84

F/Y 85

TOTAL

1444
$ 86.3 M
3620
(40%)
110
63
80

1459
$ 85.6 M
2391
(61%)
121
175
90

752
$ 74.9 M
947
(80%)
170
390
55

4420
$302.4 M
9439
(47%)
596
799
359

The Custom's Office of Investigations was the lead in seventy-five cases and participated in three additional investigations. These seventy-eight investigations have, to date,
produced the following:
Totals
Defendants
Fines Levied
Civil Penalties
Civil Forfeitures (Value)
Restitutions
Years Imprisonment
Years Probation
Charitable/Community Service
Fugitives
Pending Trial

Corporations
37
$5,287,945
$ 10,000

Individuals
187
967,500
0
$1,682,000
$12,000,000
133 yrs.
174 yrs.
6010 hrs.
24
61
$

U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EXPORT CONTROL CASES (June 1985)
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Secretary Caspar Weinberger estimates that United States taxpayers
have been saved "$20 billion to $50 billion in additional future defense
expenditures [that] would have been needed to counter soviet technological advances .... ",48
The Customs Service does not license export shipments. Rather, it
enforces the law on behalf of other agencies. 49 If Customs personnel
(available from the U.S. Customs Service, Wash., D.C.). See also Moles, supra note 7, at 27
(discussion of Operation Exodus in the popular press).
48. How Soviets Steal U.S. High-Tech Secrets, supra note 15, at 38. For additional examples of high-technology equipment being intercepted by Customs, see Russians Are
"Robbing Us Blind," Wash. Times, May 20, 1985, at 1. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. See also Orgeron, Inspectors and OperationExodus, CUSTOMS TODAY, Fall 1982,
at 13.
49. In controlling imports of various commodities, the U.S. Customs Service enforces
over 400 federal laws for more than 40 federal agencies. Most of these are in the area of
import control. However, the Customs Service acts as agent for seven federal agencies to
enforce export controls. A "controlled commodity" can be exported only under a license
granted by the primary agency having jurisdiction over that commodity. Listed below are
the controlled commodities and the primary agency on whose behalf Customs enforces export controls.
CONTROLLED COMMODITY

PRIMARY AGENCY

Arms, ammunition, and implements
of war
Fish and wildlife
(Endangered species)

State Dep't Office of Munitions

Gas (natural) and electric energy

Federal Power Commission

Narcotics and dangerous drugs

Dep't of Justice
Drug Enforcement Administration

Petroleum and petroleum products

Dep't of Energy, Economic
Regulatory Administration

Tobacco seeds and plants

Dep't of Agriculture
Agriculture Marketing Service

Watercraft (includes vessels of war
which are controlled for State
Department, Office of Munitions
Control)

Dep't of Commerce
Maritime Administration

High technology items includingComputers & related-equip.
Semiconductors
Communications, navigation,
and control systems
Lasers and optics materials
Nuclear physics materials
Microbiology materials

State Dep't Office of Munitions
Control

Dep't of the Interior
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service

Dep't of Commerce

NOTE: These high technology items may be controlled both by the State
Department's Office of Munitions Control and by the Commerce Department,
depending on their specifications and characteristics.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, FACT SHEET (Feb. 1983).
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discover commodities lacking the required export license, they notify
the exporter, or the exporter's agent, and temporarily detain the shipment while the licensing agency is notified through the Exodus Command Center in Washington, D.C. The Customs Service's detention/
referral procedure usually takes less than one day. s ° Licensing determinations by the Department of Commerce average twenty-two days,
while those by the State Department's Office of Munitions Control av51
erage nineteen days.
To minimize delays to legitimate exports, the Customs Service developed a procedure that permits the release of detained merchandise
under a surety system. The procedure only applies to goods awaiting license determinations by the Commerce Department. If the situation
meets certain criteria, Customs may permit an exporter to post a surety
bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit. This is to ensure that funds are
available if the Commerce Department denies the license and subsequently levies a penalty against the exporter. The exporter then signs a
statement attesting that the commodity is not subject to the require52
ment for a validated license under Commerce regulations.
When a shipment is seized, the Customs Service sends the exporter
a Notice of Seizure telling the exporter which Customs Office will handle the case. The Fines, Penalties, and Forfeiture Officer then confers
with the licensing agency to determine if a bond should be set to release
the goods. Before the Customs Service will release the shipment, the
exporter must post the required bond (typically ten percent of the ex53
port value of the shipment) and submit a valid license.
B.

PENALTIES FOR EXPORT VIOLATIONS

If a license is denied by either the Department of Commerce
(DOC) or the State Department, the Customs Service cannot release
the shipment. In this event, the Customs Service begins a fine, penalty,
4
or forfeiture proceeding as it would for a violation of a Customs law.5
The exporter may file a petition with the Customs Service for mitigation of a penalty or remission of the merchandise. Civil penalties, other
than forfeiture, are assessed only by the licensing agency (DOC), not
the Customs Service. 55 When an export shipment is seized, the Exodus
50.
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54. See id. The procedures are detailed in 19 C.F.R. pt. 171 (1986). See 22 U.S.C. § 401
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team's final step is to notify the Office of Investigations in Customs
headquarters. The Customs Service investigates those exporters it believes may be intentionally violating provisions of export control
statutes.56

Non-compliance with export laws, or even attempting or conspiring
to violate export laws or regulations, subjects the violator to harsh penalties. Penalties range from fines to imprisonment. 57 An exporter may
56. ADVISORY 2, supra note 53, at 1. Congress, in its most recent amendment of the
EAA, gave specific, strong authority to the U.S. Customs Service to rout out high technology export violators and to enforce its provisions. The new law provides in part:
(1) To the extent necessary or appropriate to [enforce] this Act... any department or agency exercising any function thereunder (and officers or employees of
such department or agency specifically designated by the head thereof) may
make such investigations [inside or outside the United States] and obtain such information from, require such reports or the keeping of such records by, make
such inspection of the books, records, and other writings, premises, or property
of, and take the sworn testimony of, any person....
The Secretary and [others so designated] . . . may conduct, outside the United
States, pre-license investigations and post-shipment verifications of items licensed
for export, and [enforcement] investigations...
(2)(A) the United States Customs Service is authorized, in the enforcement of
this Act, to search, detain (after search), and seize goods or technology at those
ports of entry or exit from the United States where officers of the Customs Service are authorized by law to conduct such searches, detentions, and seizures, and
at those places outside the United States where the Customs Service, pursuant to
agreements or other arrangements with other countries, is authorized to perform
enforcement activities.
(B) An officer of the United States Customs Service may do the following in
carrying out enforcement authority under this Act:
(i) Stop, search, and examine a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or person on
which or whom such officer has reasonable cause to suspect there are any goods
or technology that has been, is being, or is about to be exported from the United
States in violation of this Act.
(ii) Search any package or container in which such officer has reasonable cause to suspect there are any goods or technology that has been, is being, or
is about to be exported from the United States in violation of this Act.
(iii) Detain (after search) or seize and secure for trial any goods or
technology on or about such vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or person, or in such package or container, if such officer has probable cause to believe the goods or technology has been, is being, or is about to be exported from the United States in
violation of this Act.
(iv) Make arrests without warrant for any violation of this Act committed in his or her presence or view or if the officer has probable cause to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such a violation.
Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 12, 93 Stat. 530 (1979), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 113, 99 Stat.
148, 149 (1985) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 2411(a)). Thus, the Customs Service is given authority to check on shipments of high technology goods, both inside and outside the U.S.,
and may make such checks before, during, and after the sale of the goods to make sure
high technology goods do not fall into Soviet hands.
57. See 50 U.S.C. § 2410 (1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 112, 99 Stat. 146
(1985)). The new law adds "attempt" to violation provisions. Section 2410, provides in
part:
whoever knowingly violates or conspires to or attempts to violate any provision
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also be denied export privileges. For high technology corporations dependent on export sales, this last penalty could mean bankruptcy as
well as lawsuits for breach of contract. Even if harsh penalties are not
imposed, detentions, delays, or seizures of products may result in additional costs to the exporter, bad publicity, or severed business relationships with overseas customers, and distributors.
of this Act or any regulation, order, or license issued thereunder shall be fined
not more than five times the value of the exports involved or $50,000, whichever
is greater, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(1) Whoever willfully violates or conspires to or attempts to violate any
provision of this Act or any regulation, order, or license issued thereunder, with
knowledge that the exports involved will be used for the benefit of, or that the
destination or intended destination of the goods or technology involved is, any
controlled country to which exports are controlled for national security or foreign policy purposes, shall be fined not more than five times the value of the exports involved or $100,000, whichever is greater, or imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both.
(2) Any person who is issued a validated license under this Act for the export of any good or technology to a controlled country and who, with knowledge
that such a good or technology is being used by such controlled country for military or intelligence gathering purposes contrary to the conditions under which
the license was issued, willfully fails to report such use to the Secretary of Defense, shall be fined not more than five times the value of the exports involved or
$100,000, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.
(3) Any person who possesses any goods or technology(A) with the intent to export such goods or technology in violation of an
export control imposed under this Act or
(B) knowing or having reason to believe the goods or technology would be
so exported, shall.., be subject to the penalties set forth... this subsection....
(4) Any person who takes any action with the intent to evade the provisions
of this Act or any regulation, order, or license issued under this Act shall be subject to the penalties set forth [here].
(5) Nothing in this subsection or subsection (a) shall limit the power of the
Secretary to define by regulations violations under this Act.
(1) The Secretary... may impose a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 for each
violation of this Act ....
(2)(A) The authority under this Act to suspend or revoke the authority of any
United States person to export goods or technology may be used....
(a) Any person who is convicted under subsection (a) or (b) shall, in addition to any other penalty, forfeit to the United States (A) any of that person's interest in, security of, claim against, or property
or contractual rights of any kind in the goods or tangible items that were the subject of the violation;
(B) any of that person's interest in, security of, claim against, or property or
contractual rights of any kind in tangible property that was used in the export or
attempt to export that was the subject of the violation; and
(C) any of that person's property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the violation.
(h) No person convicted of a violation ... shall be eligible, at the discretion
of the Secretary, to apply for or use any export license under this Act for a period of up to 10 years from the date of the conviction. The Secretary may revoke
any export license under this Act in which such person has an interest at the
time of the conviction.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS

Enactment of the EAA, and other United States government attempts to intercept the illegal exports of high technology, have been
subject to many legal challenges. One major aspect of the EAA is the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the law: that is, the law gives federal au58
thorities the power to enforce export controls in other countries.
Also, the federal government's interception of high technology exports
under the EAA provisions have been challenged under various constitutional theories such as the rights of due process, the commerce clause,
the fourth amendment's search and seizure provisions, and the first
amendment.
1. ExtraterritorialApplication
The EAA authorizes export controls on "goods, technology, other
information subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or exported
by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 59 Congress intended that the Customs Service play a major role in the extraterritorial enforcement of the EAA.6 0 "Extraterritoriality" refers to the
application of the EAA to transactions or activities outside the United
States' borders. Generally, principles of international law give each
state sovereignty within its boundaries and prohibit other states from
acting unilaterally in another state's territory. 61 However, under cer58. Report Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 113, 99 Stat.
148. The EAA is not the only federal legislation that has extraterritorial elements. Several other statutes either regulate activities outside the U.S. or control conduct in the U.S.
that affects foreign nations. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1-44 (1982); 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982); 42
U.S.C. § 2011 (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); 50 U.S.C. § 1701-06 (1982).
59. EAA, supra note 26, § 6, 93 Stat. at 503 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2405).
60. See H.R. REP. No. 80, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 62-63, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 124-25.
Application of United States Law: The Case of Ex61. See Comment, Extraterritorial
port Controls, 132 U. PENN. L. REV. 355, 366-72 (1984). See also Fazzone, Business Effects
of the ExtraterritorialReach of the U.S. Export Control Laws, 15 INT'L L. & POL. 545
(1983). Samie, ExtraterritorialEnforcement of United States AntitrustLaws: The British
Reaction, 16 INT'L LAw. 313 (1982). Tittman, Extra-territorialApplication to U.S. Export
Control Laws on Foreign Subsidiariesof U.S. Corporations: An American Lawyer's View
from Europe, 16 INT'L LAw. 730 (1982). Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Export
AdministrationAct of 1979 Under International and American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1308 (1983). See generally Dam, Economic and PoliticalAspects of Extraterritoriality,19
INT'L LAw. 887 (1985); Feinberg, Economic Coercionand Economic Sanctions: The Expansion of the United States ExtraterritorialJurisdiction30 AM. U.L. REV. 323 (1981); Gollieb, Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspective, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 449 (1983);
Jackson, United States-EEC Trade Relations: ConstitutionalProblems of Economic Interdependence, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 453 (1979); Kastenbaum & Olson, FederalAmicus
Intervention in PrivateAntitrust Litigation Raising Issues of Extraterritoriality:A Modest Proposal,16 INT'L LAW. 587 (1982).
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tain circumstances, extraterritorial application of another country's law
is accepted as an exception to the basic sovereignty rule.6 2
The EAA legislates extraterritorial jurisdiction in several instances.
No person may reexport a technology that was originally exported from
the United States, nor can they export with the knowledge that the
product will be reexported. 63 Unless authorized by the Office of Export
Administration, "no person in the United States or a foreign country
may: Reexport any technical data imported from the United States"
nor export or reexport any foreign-produced product if the product contains a major portion of United States technical data.64
The purpose of the EAA's extraterritorial jurisdiction is to stop exporters from getting around the law by indirect export. If the EAA did
not grant this power, United States exporters could export to an authorized location and then arrange for a reexport to the desired unauthorized location.65 The alternatives to extraterritorial jurisdiction are
either to stop high technology exports, or to place stringent controls on
exports and allow them only to those countries that are friendly to the
United States. 66 To further the United States' foreign policy objectives,
the President is authorized to control exports.6 7 The President has
power to apply the EAA extraterritorially by regulating the export of
"goods, technology, or other information subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States," and exports by "any person subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States." 68 Although Congress authorizes extraterritorial application of the EAA, authorization under international law is
69
disputed.
Two cases have tested both the legality and the efficacy of the
EAA's extraterritorial controls. In 1981, the United States responded to
the imposition of martial law in Poland by imposing economic sanctions
and by tightening the trade restrictions on exports to the Soviet
Union.7 0 In order to obstruct Soviet efforts to construct a trans-Siberian oil and gas pipeline, the United States sought western European co62. See Comment, supra note 61, at 369. A state may have jurisdiction to govern its

own citizens, even if they are in a foreign location, under the nationality principle.
63. 15 C.F.R. § 374.1 (1986).
64. Id. § 379.8(a)(1).
65. Moyer & Mabrey, Export Controls as Instruments of ForeignPolicy: The History,
Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 108
(1983).
66. See Comment, supra note 61, at 382.
67. 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).

68. IL
69. See Moyer & Mabrey, supra note 65; Note, In the Wake of the Pipeline Embargo:
European-UnitedStates Dialogue, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 73 (1984).

70. 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250-52 (1982). See Legislation and Regulations, 21 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 864 (1982).
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operation to halt oil and gas production equipment going to the Soviets.
In June 1982, the United States began to require prior written authorization from the Department of Commerce for the export of all oil and
gas related technology or data by any person subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, including technology not originating from the
United States.7 1 Regulations defined "persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" 72 to include foreign subsidiaries of the United
States firms, foreign firms using United States technology, and foreign
73
firms owned by United States shareholders.
Europeans strongly objected to United States' pipeline regulations.
The European Economic Community (EEC) filed a formal diplomatic
protest with the Department of State, 74 and other European nations
either ordered or strongly encouraged their companies to ignore the
United States' regulations. 75 Faced with this pressure and outright hostility, the United States finally backed down and lifted the pipeline restrictions before any judicial ruling on the lawfulness of the United
States regulations could assess either the domestic or international legal
76
implications of these extraterritorial restrictions.
One case did arise out of United States' attempts to embargo construction of the Soviet trans-Siberian pipeline. Dresser Industries
(United States) and Dresser (France) lost a three million dollar parts
contract with General Motors because, under the United States directive, the parts were to be used for the Soviet oil and gas pipeline. 77 The
French government served Dresser (France) with a "Requisition Order
for Services" to complete delivery of the Soviet-bound parts. 78 Dresser
Industries loaded the parts onto ships but the United States Department of Commerce issued orders denying Dresser export privileges for
79
the oil and gas parts.
In an equity action in federal district court, Dresser sought to enjoin the United States government from enforcing sanctions on Dresser
for shipping the parts to the Soviets.8 0 In denying injunctive relief, the
court wrote that there was a "potential for profound harm" if the government were enjoined from halting Dresser's shipment.8 ' The court
71. 47 Fed. Reg. at 27,250. More detailed discussions of the pipeline controversy can
be found in Comment, supra note 61, at 364-66 and in Note, supra note 69, at 73.
72. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
73. Legislation and Regulations, supra note 70, at 866.
74. Id at 891.
75. Note, supra note 69, at 79.
76. Note, supra note 61, at 1310.
77. Fazzone, supra note 61, at 573-74 n.4.
78. Ellicott, supra note 25, at 553.
79. 1d
80. Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982).
81. Id. at 110.
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noted that United States regulations were a major foreign policy exercise designed to prevent the construction of the Soviet pipeline and that
the regulations were "essential to the accomplishment of important for'8 2
eign policy objectives.
The experience with Dresser signals a trend in the Department of
Commerce that should extend to the Customs Service operating under
Operation Exodus, namely, that a broad application of extraterritorial
jurisdiction will be applied to further United States foreign policy goals
of keeping technology out of the Soviet Union's hands. This jurisdiction
will not be exerted without straining relations with those countries that
might be affected.8 3 Foreign demand may be shifted away from United
States technology manufacturers if the foreign buyers are leary of
United States law. Because of the uncertainty surrounding high technology sales overseas, contracts should be carefully drawn to recognize
a myriad of contingencies, including: (1) risk allocation among parties
for the impossibility of performance; (2) contingency plans for substitute products; (3) excuse of performance if the government intervenes;
and (4) no liability if a party is unable to obtain a license or if a license
is revoked. Moreover, contracts should specify which country will have
jurisdiction over any possible mediation, arbitration, or litigation arising
84
out of the transaction.
2. Legal Challenges
Operation Exodus is a relatively new program, but the effort to
control technology exports from the United States is really old wine in
a new bottle. Throughout the Nation's history, import and export controls have been in effect.8 5 When the United States government has intercepted high technology exports in the past, those actions have been
challenged on several legal theories. No doubt such challenges will be
pondered in the future if Operation Exodus is successful in fulfilling its
goal of stopping the outflow of high technology to the Soviets. This subsection discusses several court cases that have raised legal challenges to
the government's interception of high technology goods.
In United States v. Brumage, the defendant's electronics company
was prosecuted for willfully exporting electronic and technical equip86
ment to Hungary and East Germany without a valid export license.
82. Id
83. See Tittman, supra note 61, at 733. Several foreign governments have reacted by
enacting legislation to prevent foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from complying with
various U.S. directives.
84. See Fazzone, supra note 61, at 579-87.
85. See Berman & Garson, supra note 6, at 791. See also Note, supra note 6 at 575.
86. 377 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). The defendant was charged specifically with violating § 6(b) of the EAA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b).
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The defendant argued that the EAA was unconstitutionally vague because the EAA proscribed certain exports to "Communist-dominated
nations," and that reasonable men could differ as to which countries
would be covered.8 7 The court rejected this argument primarily because regulations promulgated under the EAA identified which nations
were "Communist-dominated."8 8 Today, a void-for-vagueness challenge
for Exodus seizures would similarly fail because foreign nations to
whom exporting is illegal are noted by statute.8 9
In United States v. Spawr Optical Research, Inc.,9° the defendants
were convicted of violating provisions of the EAA because they unlawfully exported laser mirrors to the Soviet Union. After inventing a superior process for polishing laser optics and mirrors, the Spawrs, the
owners of Optical Research, explored international markets through a
business arrangement with a West German national, named Weber,
who promoted and distributed Spawr mirrors in several communist
block nations, including the Soviet Union.91 In January 1976, Weber obtained the Spawrs' authorization to accept an order for mirrors from a
purchasing agency of the Soviet government. 92 The Spawrs shipped the
order to Weber in West Germany who then forwarded the entire order
to Moscow. 93 The Spawrs never obtained a validated export license for
the mirrors that were exported. 94
In April 1976, when Weber notified Spawr that Weber had received
a second Soviet order for Spawr mirrors, Spawr filed an application
with the Commerce Department for a validated export license to ship
some of the mirrors to the Soviets. 95 The Commerce Department de87. 377 F. Supp. at 147.
88. The regulations cited were at 15 C.F.R. § 370.11. The court listed several other
reasons to reject the vagueness challenge, including the proposition that an act of Congress is presumptively valid, and that Congress has broad powers to regulate trade with
foreign nations under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 377 F. Supp. at 1480. See also United States
v. Zheng, 768 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 806 (1986). In Zheng the defendant was charged with unlawful purchase and export of high technology equipment.
Zheng challenged the statute on the grounds of vagueness, arguing that the Arms Export

Control Act, which addressed "items" that were prohibited from export, was too vague.
The court, extensively discussing congressional intent surrounding "items," struck down

the challenge. Cf. United States v. Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. 550 (D. Mass. 1983), appeal dismissed, 723 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1983) (where the defendants were charged under the
EAA with making misleading statements to the Customs Service; the statute was not
void-for-vagueness).
89. See supra notes 25, 29, 30, and accompanying text.
90. 685 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983).
91. Id. at 1079.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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nied the application on October 7, 1976 pursuant to Executive Order
1194096 and existing export regulations, because the mirrors were found
to have "significant strategic applications" which posed a potential
threat to national security. 97 In February 1977, however, Spawr shipped
mirrors to a freight forwarder in Switzerland. Weber then relabeled
the packages containing the mirrors and shipped them to Moscow. 98
The Spawrs did not dispute the government's authority to prosecute them for exporting mirrors to fill the first Soviet order. The
Spawrs, however, asserted that the government lacked authority to
prosecute them for exporting mirrors for the second Soviet orders because (1) there was no genuine national emergency, (2) the regulations
were not rationally related to any emergency then in existence, and
(3) the lapse of the EAA shows that Congress intended to terminate the
regulations. 99 The court struck down all three contentions.
The court declined to address the "national emergency" question,
holding that it was a political question. Further, the court held that
regulations limiting the export of high technology goods were rationally
related to various national emergencies. 100 The court cited Presidential
Proclamation Number 2914 which declared a national emergency based
in part on events that "imperil the efforts of this country and those of
the United Nations to prevent aggression and armed conflict." 10 1 The
court held that this effort to limit the exportation of strategic items
"clearly had a rational relationship to the prevention of aggression and
u0 2
armed conflict.'
Finally, the court rejected the Spawrs' argument that Congress intended to terminate these export regulations by allowing the EAA to
lapse. The court noted that various presidential and congressional actions taken when the EAA had previously lapsed were taken to maintain the export regulations.' 0 3 Congress "conferred on the President
the rulemaking authority necessary to maintain the regulations [which
reflects] concern for preserving existing regulation imposed under
emergency authority, including ...

the transaction control regulations,

which prohibit U.S. persons from participating in shipping strategic
96.
12,002,
97.
98.
99.

50 U.S.C. app. § 2403 (1976) (Ex. Ord. No. 11940 was revoked by Ex. Ord. No.
July 7, 1977, 92 Fed. Reg. 35,623).
685 F.2d at 1079.
Id.
Id at 1080. The EAA had lapsing dates incorporated into it, but has continually

been reenacted.
100. Id. at 1081.
101. Id. at 1081, citing 3 C.F.R. §§ 99, 100 (1949-53 compilation).
102. 685 F.2d at 1081.
103. Id. See Exec. Ord. No. 11940, 3 C.F.R. § 150 (1976), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app.

§ 2403.
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goods to... the Soviet Union."'' 1 4 Using Spanwr Optical as an example,
the Customs Service's rules implementing Operation Exodus may or
may not be in response to a "national emergency." This may be of no
consequence because the court deems this a political matter. Even if it
were not a "political question," there are a plethora of presidential and
congressional directives supporting any agency actions designed to in10 5
tercept high technology exports going overseas.
Other challenges to the EAA have involved the fifth amendment
rights to due process'06 and illegal search and seizure under the fourth
amendment. 10 7 However, these attempts to thwart conviction under the
EAA do not relate to actions by the Customs Service or other agencies
in intercepting high technology goods. Rather, they are challenges generally used to avoid conviction. What is clear from the limited amount
of existing case law is that Operation Exodus has enough legal precedent behind it to be a strong tool in the government's efforts to stem
illegal exports to Soviet block countries.

V. STRATEGIES FOR THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION AND THE PRACTITIONER TO
AVOID OPERATION EXODUS LIABILITY
When preparing to ship high technology orders overseas, a shipper
should identify orders for products, parts, or technology which are
likely to be shipped abroad and see that they are handled by personnel
104. 685 F.2d at 1081, citing S. Rep. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4540, 4542. It should be noted that the President con-

tinually extends export controls under the EAA. See Exec. Ord. No. 12,444, 19 WEEKLY
COmP. PRES. Doc. 1436 (Oct. 14, 1983); Message to Congress Reporting on the Continuation of Export Control Regulations, id. at 1437; Exec. Ord. No. 12,470, Continuation of Export Control Regulations, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 452-54 (1984). See Announcement
Concerning Licensing and Enforcement Procedures [under the EAA], 20 WEEKLY COMsP.
PREs. Doc. 420-21 (1984). For other older examples, see Exec. Ord. No. 11810, 3 C.F.R. 905
(1971-75 compilation) (covering 29-day lapse; revoked by Exec. Ord. No. 1181, 3 C.F.R. 924
(1971-75 compilation)); Exec. Ord. No. 11796, 3 C.F.R. 888 (1971-75 compilation) (covering
14-day lapse; revoked by Exec. Ord. No. 11798, 3 C.F.R. 890 (1971-75 compilation)); Exec.
Ord. No. 11677, 3 C.F.R. 719 (1971-75 compilation) (covering 28-day lapse; revoked by
Exec. Ord. No. 11683, 3 C.F.R. 724 (1971-75 compilation)).
105. See supra notes 25, 30-37.
106. Trane Co. v. Baldrige, 552 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Wis. 1983), off'd, 728 F.2d 915, cert
denied, 105 S.Ct. 105 (1984) (corporations doing business with Arab States challenged portions of the EAA and implementing regulations, but it was held that the prohibitions did
not infringe on plaintiffs' first amendment right of free speech, fifth amendment substantive or procedural due process rights, or rights under the ninth amendment).
107. United States v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1986) (regarding suppression of
evidence under the "good faith" exception to the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule).
See United States v. Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. 550 (D. Mass. 1983) (search and seizure
issues).
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experienced in export matters. 0 8 Companies manufacturing high technology products should ensure that corporate personnel know current
export regulations and that appropriate screening and license procedures are followed. On both foreign and domestic purchases, many
companies notify a purchaser in writing that a validated export license
is required and this is built into standard contract language. 10 9 Similarly, company employees living abroad or traveling internationally
should be informed about United States government restrictions on the
movement of high technology out of the United States. Any questions
relating to licensing requirements and potential problems should be directed to the appropriate agency or to corporate counsel. 110
To expedite legitimate exports, all requests by the Customs Service
for specifications on items that are being detained for examination
should be filled promptly. Often licensing determinations can only be
made after the licensing agency (the Department of Commerce or the
Department of State, Office of Munitions Control) receives adequate
specifications from the manufacturers.' 1 ' The exporter should be sure
that product specifications are written by a technical engineer, not the
marketing manager who may exaggerate.
To prevent illegal exports, altered shipping schedules, and fines,
corporate policies must include an aggressive in-house program
stressing regulatory compliance. To effect the policies, the company's
export licensing procedures should be checked routinely to ensure accuracy and effectiveness. This requires commitment to an effective export
control program from top management; this commitment should be regularly communicated to the company's employees, contractors, and buyers. Also, a centralized export licensing staff should be designated.
Within this staff, there should be procedures to ensure communication
between the export licensing staff, the marketing department, customer
relations, and shipping personnel. This staff should maintain clear lines
of communication not only within the office, but between licensing
agencies and the Customs Service to help speed up various administrative processes.
VI

CONCLUSION

Operation Exodus represents a strong effort by the United States
Customs Service to intercept illegal exports of high technology products
to Soviet bloc countries. While the number of seizures has increased
108. DEP'T OF TREASURY, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, BUSINESS ADVISORY No. 3 ON OPERATION EXODUS (Jan. 1984).
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since Operation Exodus was implemented, it is difficult to know what
percent of the total amount of illegal exports these seizures represent.112 The real test of the effectiveness of Operation Exodus will
probably occur five to ten years from now when a proper intelligence
survey of the balance sheet (seizures versus losses) can be made. Until
then, to prevent penalties, heavy fines, or imprisonment, corporate officers and practitioners working with high technology companies should
maintain tight export licensing procedures and practices.

112. See supra note 47 for information on seizures.

